Your plant, checked from the outside.
The gear in these advisories is the gear AirScan looks for first.
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Free. Read-only from start to finish — AirScan never logs in, never sends a command, and scans only the network you're connecting from.
A strong password doesn't fix an open door.
The FCC's rule starts with strong passwords, and that's worth doing. But here are a few real ones, just for interest — documented ways broadcast gear has actually been broken into. Notice how rarely a password was the thing standing in the way.
The box that puts emergency alerts on US TV and radio. A shared root SSH key shipped in its firmware — anyone with it logs in as root and can broadcast fake EAS alerts.
Remote code execution through the transmitter's web interface — a crafted request runs commands and takes over the whole device.
A crafted firmware package runs attacker code — the update is never verified.
Authentication bypassed straight to full Administrator.
A valid session can be lifted from the logs and hijacked.
Cross-site scripting in that same emergency-alert box. The FCC told every EAS station to patch it and get it off the internet.
Unauthenticated attacker can blank the credentials and take over the admin panel.
The device hands over its stored credentials in plain text.
A hidden administrator account protected only by hard-coded credentials.
The login check runs client-side — bypass it and you're admin.
An unauthenticated upload overwrites the firmware and runs code.
Hard-coded administrator credentials baked into the device.
Incorrect access control lets an attacker run commands as admin.
Broken session handling lets an attacker hijack a session.
A crafted JSON payload escalates a low user to full privileges.
Authentication bypassed through an alternate path — no privileges needed.
One unauthenticated request reboots the transmitter — instant dead air.
The admin password is readable unauthenticated, then used to log in.
A too-short session ID is brute-forced to bypass login and drive the transmitter.
DHS and FEMA warned every US EAS station after a researcher demonstrated that emergency-alert encoder/decoders could be used to broadcast fake alerts across TV, radio and cable.
Attackers reached stations' EAS equipment through default passwords and aired a fake emergency alert warning that the dead were rising from their graves.
Attackers rewrote the RDS text on listeners' receivers. The engineers' verdict: changing default passwords “isn't really good enough.”
An FCC nationwide notice after US stations had their studio-to-transmitter audio paths taken over and attacker audio put on air.
Attackers reached the transmitter's built-in RBDS, changed the on-air data and the login — reportedly via the factory-set password.
Just a handful of what's on public record — not a ranking, and nowhere near a full list. Sources: CISA / NVD advisories and public industry reporting.
The rule is the floor. We show you the door.
FCC §11.35(d) asks for three things
AirScan is built around the third one — the control that every incident above keeps coming back to. It shows you exactly what's reachable from outside your plant, so "behind a firewall" stops being a line you tick on a form and becomes something you can actually see, fix, and prove. That's going past the minimum — which is the point.